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Since joining the WTO in 2001, around every four years China has presented the world with 
a new concept, strategy, or programme. These concepts are deeply rooted in the Chinese 
political system, but encapsulated in simple and memorable slogans. They have caused a 
great deal of both excitement and confusion abroad and within China. Past examples include 
‘Peaceful Rise’, a ‘Harmonious World’, and ‘New Great Power Relations’.
The latest fashion is the ‘Belt and Road Initiative’, commonly known as One Belt, One Road in 
public. No other policy in the world has launched as many global debates, with both serious 
doubts and some enthusiasm seen from academics, policymakers, and entrepreneurs. In May 
2017, Beijing hosted the first ever ‘Belt and Road Forum’ in its usual lavish and choreographed 
style, attended by 29 head of states and delegates from 130 countries, to consolidate what 
China has achieved so far and to further promote the initiative (Xinhua, 2017).
In September 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping visited several Central Asian republics. He 
reiterated China’s intention of pursuing a policy of large-scale investment. He emphasised 
the revival of the economic and cultural ties that once characterised China’s relations with 
Eurasian countries during the past glory of the Silk Road, and promoted recreating the Silk 
Road Economic Belt in connection with the Maritime Silk Road. But despite the trade statistics, 
numerous conferences, tailored financial derivatives, and new rail connections, defining the 
OBOR initiative is still difficult for the world outside China. It remains “longer on sweeping 
vision than on nuts-and-bolts practicalities” (De Jonquieres, 2015).
Global analysts focus on the impact, positive or negative, of this ambitious undertaking while 
remaining vague about what OBOR is and what aims China are pursuing through it. Few 
analysts understand who in Beijing decides on OBOR projects and how the overall budget is 
distributed through the government. 
A key reason for this tendency to overlook the complications of OBOR and Chinese foreign 
policy decision-making in general is the assumption that China is a static and authoritarian 
state where policy is simply dictated from the top. This perception may have been valid under 
Mao, but is certainly no longer the case in contemporary China. 
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Dramatic changes in the distribution of 
power and devolution of authority within 
Chinese bureaucracies have been happening 
since Deng Xiaoping’s momentous 
economic reforms. OBOR is one of the 
best illustrations, perhaps the best, of 
institutional power distribution below the 
top Party Leadership.
Central ministries and provincial 
governments have scrambled to give OBOR 
a meaning, gauge what it means for them, 
and most importantly, how OBOR could 
be used to get hold of or justify the use of 
project funds.
Another key feature of OBOR often ignored 
by pundits is the supremacy of domestic 
interests. This initiative is designed mostly 
to consume China’s excessive industrial 
capacity, to secure its long-term energy 
supply, and equally importantly to stabilise 
the troublesome Western borders of the 
Middle Kingdom that have been threatened 
by rampant home-grown Islamic jihadists.
This Strategic Update doesn’t examine every 
stakeholder in OBOR or detail all its projects, 
but takes an inside-out approach to offer a 
concise guide to OBOR is and how it is run.
 
WhAT IS OnE BELT, OnE ROAD?
Chinese President Xi Jinping first used the 
term One Belt, One Road at the Conference 
on Interaction and Confidence-Building 
Measures in Asia, held in Shanghai in May 
2014 (Xi, 2014). 
Based on published documents, the 
OBOR consists of a staggering numbers of 
infrastructure projects, railways, ports, and 
oil pipelines (NDRC 2015).
To be more specific, the Silk Road 
Economic Belt (One Belt) aspires to 
connect China with Central Asia, South 
East Asia, South Asia, Russia, and Europe 
by land while the 21st Century Maritime 
Silk Road (One Road) links China’s coastal 
regions with Southeast and South Asia, the 
South Pacific, the Middle East, and Eastern 
Africa (ibid). So far, over 60 countries have 
expressed an interest in participating  
in OBOR.
The planned scale of OBOR is astronomical. 
The countries it plans to include comprise 
55% of World Gross National Product, 
70% of the world’s population, and 75% 
of known energy reserves. The initiative 
is funded with $100 billion from the Asia 
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and 
$40 billion from the Silk Road Fund  
(Xi, 2013).
Some Chinese pundits insist that OBOR 
demonstrates China’s intention to offer 
‘public goods’ to the world in general, with 
the economic might of the West has been 
in relative decline (Wu, 2015). Alternatively, 
that has provided an opportunity for China 
to flex its economic muscles and acquire 
greater political and geostrategic clout. 
China’s unexpected success in launching the 
AIIB, joined by 57 founding member states, 
will continue to provide impetus for OBOR. 
Beijing is aware that most participating 
countries are in fragile economies with 
poor infrastructure and an unskilled labour 
force. Some of the participating countries 
have natural geographic challenges such 
as weather conditions and scattered 
populations. For example, there are very few 
arable lands for crop production and a wide 
area of permafrost between Europe and  
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West Siberia where China plans to  
establish railway and telecom facilities to 
achieve connectivity.2  
A COnTAInER  
FOR DOMESTIC AFFAIRS?
As argued earlier, too many pundits and 
policy practitioners in the West stress the 
geo-economic and geo-political significances 
of OBOR without paying attention to 
how domestic politics dictate the policies, 
budgetary distribution and detail of OBOR.  
No discussion of major Chinese policy can 
ignore the ultimate aim of the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP): staying in power 
and keeping absolute control. This requires 
stability, and in turn requires the CCP keep 
its ‘social contract’ with ordinary Chinese 
people of growth and employment. OBOR is 
no exception.
Against the backdrop of the Chinese 
economic slowdown and much discussed 
efforts economic rebalancing, China is 
searching for a new engine of economic 
growth. In particular, the government is 
looking for a way to reduce the regional 
economic development imbalance, one of 
the negative legacies left by Deng Xiaoping’s 
landmark reforms. OBOR has become key 
to this, connecting China’s diverse regional 
development and revival programmes 
such Developing the Great West, Raising 
the Central Region, and Revitalize The Old 
Northeast Industrial Bases.
To this extent, one could argue that OBOR is 
not a brand new initiative that was created 
by President Xi and his team overnight. 
Rather, it serves as a ‘bag’ or ‘container’ that 
virtually everything can be thrown into. Since 
the convening of the Central Financial and 
Economic Conference in December 2014, 
where the launch of the OBOR initiative 
was officially decided, all 31 provincial level 
governments from Hainan to Hei Longjiang 
have scrambled to list their preferred projects 
and industries to be supported by OBOR 
(Xinhua, 2015a). Some foreign pundits and 
even President Xi himself have commented 
on its lack of clarity (Xi, 2015).
In a broader sense, OBOR is seen as an 
essential element of China’s further economic 
reform process itself. It was explicitly linked 
to the economic reforms of the Third Plenum 
of the 18th Party Congress, which focused 
on market allocation of resources with 
discussions indicating the senior leadership’s 
thinking. To this extent, OBOR may also offer 
an ‘upgraded’ version of China’s ‘Go Global’ 
strategy of making overseas investments, 
infrastructure building, and conducting 
mergers and acquisitions, mostly by the 
Chinese state owned enterprises (SOEs). 
Chinese SOEs played a crucial role in the  
‘Go Global’ strategy, but despite their 
advantage of sheer size, they remain short 
of global business exposure and corporate 
governance. The Chinese leadership intends 
to use OBOR as an efficient vehicle to deepen 
its reforms to debt-laden SOEs and further 
their global footprint. 
The OBOR initiative aspires to consume 
the excessive industrial capacity triggered 
by governmental intervention and under-
performing Chinese companies. Ironically, 
it could also further exacerbate this long-
standing symptom of the current economic 
structure established by Beijing. Regardless 
of the type of OBOR project, participating 
companies are most likely to base their 
production model on the assumption 
of successful implementation of OBOR. 
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However, the eventual success of delivering 
OBOR projects is not only dependent on 
China’s financial resources and political 
capital, but equally importantly determined 
by the willingness of foreign partners. Both 
Beijing and Chinese participants must have 
a well thought out Plan B to avoid waste in 
financial resources and manpower if some 
OBOR projects do not come to fruition.
 
ThE BUREAUCRATIC LAnD RUSh
Like implementation of any Chinese  
policy, the cornerstones are laid on the 
domestic front. 
OBOR is no exception. However, it 
is suffering from a lack of policy and 
bureaucratic coordination. Xi’s ambitious 
initiative raises two key questions for Beijing 
and its OBOR partners and loan providers: 
Which departments or ministries carry the 
overall responsibility for OBOR?  
What are the selection criteria for 
categorising infrastructure projects as parts 
of the initiative?
According to the official document 
published in 2015, the lead organisation 
for coordinating efforts to pursue the 
initiative is the National Development and 
Reformation Commission (NDRC) with some 
shared responsibility from the Ministry of 
Commerce (MOFCOM) and Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (NDRC, 2015). 
NDRC remains the most powerful 
institution in Beijing’s central administration, 
probably the most powerful in China’s 
macroeconomic policymaking in general. 
However, there is a key difference between 
the policy in the official document and 
practice in the corridors of power at the 
‘Court of Zhongnanhai’. 
Using the normal CCP bureaucratic 
procedure, a ‘Small Leading Group’ has 
been set up for coming to key decisions on 
OBOR. This group, consisting of the most 
senior policymakers and meeting monthly, 
is for tackling difficult and outstanding 
issues when disagreements arise and final 
judgements are required.
The Small Leading Group for OBOR is 
based at the State Council and chaired by 
Zhang Gaoli, Standing Committee Member 
of the Party. Four deputy chairs share 
responsibilities equally: 
 ■ Wang Huining, Head of Policy 
Planning for the CCP and the so-called 
chief advisor for Xi
 ■ Wang Yang, the Deputy Premier in 
charge of Economic and Trade issues
 ■ Yang Jiechi, the State Councillor for 
Foreign Affairs
 ■ Yang Jing, the Secretary General for 
the State Council. 
Looking at the chair and deputy chairs 
alongside the official policy paper, can we 
really say that the NDRC is leading the 
policy? It has no power to override the 
decisions of any of the five chairs. It has 
become ‘sandwiched’ between the Small 
Leading Group and the relevant central 
ministries. Each of the five chairs has their 
corresponding ministries to brief. It is almost 
impossible for the ministries to speak with 
one voice.
Apart from the above four mentioned 
ministries and Small Leading Group, there 
are other 15 different ministries and 
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agencies that hold the lion’s share of votes in 
the central government, influencing which 
projects are chosen to be part of OBOR. It 
would be naive to assume that the Ministry 
of Finance and Ministry of Transportation 
have similar views while selecting high-
speed railway projects across OBOR-related 
countries. The former looks for project 
with a solid return on investment, and the 
host country’s potential financial risks and 
credibility for loans, whereas the latter looks 
for companies that can build high-speed 
railway tracks within the shortest period  
of time.
Nearly 32 provinces across China are also 
participating in ensuring their preferred 
projects being chosen. In doing so, each 
provincial government will receive a generous 
budgetary support in developing the chosen 
projects. Some provinces have begun to form 
alliances with certain central ministries to bid 
for project approvals, while other provincial 
governors and some CEOs of the State 
Owned Enterprises have taken to bypassing 
central ministries and communicating directly 
with the members of the Small Leading 
Group to gain their approvals.
A crucial reason why a selected number 
of provincial governors and CEOs of State 
Owned Enterprise can bypass the central 
administration for project approvals is 
because they outrank some ministers within 
the Party. Even though in the hierarchy of the 
state they cannot influence ministers, their 
party seniority holds huge sway.   
For example, the Minister of Transportation 
is not a member of Politburo and ranks 
No.41 within the Central Committee of 
the CCP whereas the provincial governor 
of Chongqing3 (an important Western 
Municipality) ranks No.14 in the Central 
Committee and is a member of Politburo. 
In practical terms therefore, the governor of 
Chongqing can override the decisions made 
by a government minister in relation  
to OBOR.
This bureaucratic opaqueness and 
overarching policy-related uncertainty 
presents a major obstacle in China’s efforts 
to convince the foreign partners to make a 
monetary or political investment in OBOR 
without providing an ultimate underwriter. 
Deng described his ethos for reform in 1978 
as “crossing rivers by feeling the stones”. Xi 
has clearly adopted this approach in leading 
OBOR. However, Deng used this tactic 
when China was isolated in the immediate 
aftermath of the Cultural Revolution, 
whereas Xi needs the involvement of over 60 
countries for his vision. 
Beijing’s lack of a clearly defined set of 
guidelines for the OBOR development suits 
the Chinese pragmatic approach, which 
allows the Party and the government simply 
to shift plans during the implementation 
process whenever new opportunities 
arise. However, to fully engage with 
other stakeholders China must invent a 
bureaucratic framework with reasonable 
consistency, setting up clear criteria for 
selecting potential projects that are credit 
worthy. This consistency must be spelt out 
loud and clear, and practiced diligently to 
reassure partners. Beijing is still at a very early 
stage of getting its house into good order on 
OBOR, and Xi must tidy up quickly.
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GEOPOLITICAL RISkS
Much of the Western discussion of OBOR is 
focused on Xi Jinping’s ‘new’ and ‘proactive’ 
approach to foreign affairs, in stark contrast 
to his predecessor Hu Jintao’s ‘risk-averse’ 
style. However, OBOR is also true to Deng 
Xiaoping’s essentially conservative maxim to 
Chinese foreign policy: “to create a stable 
external environment for China’s domestic 
economic growth”4 (Deng, 1982).
Many pundits both in China and the West 
inevitably compare OBOR to the US policy 
of rejuvenating Europe through the Marshall 
Plan and the re-construction of Japan in 
the immediate aftermath of the Second 
World War. These policies created global 
alliances between prosperous countries that 
supported the US economically  
and politically.
The Chinese leadership has clearly learnt 
from the Marshall Plan ethos and attempted 
to imitate it to some extent. Beijing is fully 
aware that it can only prosper if its partners 
prosper, and it can only achieve resource 
security and border stability if its Northwest 
if Islamic extremist movements cease to 
spread rampantly in the Middle East, North 
Africa, and Central Asia.
However, China faces a far more complex 
and vulnerable geo-political environment 
around its periphery than does the US. While 
many Americans demand a border wall with 
one of their two neighbours, China shares 
a land border with 17 different countries 
- many amongst the least economically 
prosperous countries in the world and 
therefor prone to ethnic conflict. China also 
has long-term border disputes with some 
of them. Most of China’s neighbours are 
unsure about what China’s motives are, and 
wary of China posing a direct challenge to 
the established players, such as Russia  
and India.
In addition, many of the participating 
countries in Central Asia and Africa are ruled 
by elderly authoritarian leaders. The Chinese 
government has been able to develop 
amicable relationships with those current 
leaders, but Beijing has neither the ability 
nor the desire to predict the next generation 
of leaders. The Chinese principle of ‘non-
intervention’ in bilateral relationships could 
jeopardise its economic interests, such as 
return on investments, if domestic power 
transitions prove problematic or create anti-
Chinese feeling.     
 
ThREE ExISTEnTIAL ChALLEnGES  
TO OBOR
Russia’s Ambivalent Attitude
China is a neighbour, partner, and a market 
to Russia. It has become a key to Moscow’s 
post-Crimea foreign policy. After the  
Cold War, Sino-Russia rapprochement  
began immediately with the normalisation  
of relations in 1989 and has been steadily 
strengthened from Boris Yeltin to  
Vladimir Putin.
Beijing’s march to the west with OBOR is 
accompanied by Russia’s move to the east. 
While OBOR puts Eurasia region centre 
stage of China’s geo-political power play, 
Moscow has traditionally viewed itself as a 
quintessential Eurasia power. 
Despite Putin and Xi agreeing to 
“harmonise” the Silk Road Economic Belt 
(One Belt) with the Moscow led Eurasia 
Economic Union, harmonisation in policy 
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and on the ground has developed at a 
slow pace (Xinhua, 2015b). Economically, 
many Russians fear Chinese ‘takeover’ 
of their country’s sluggish economy and 
infrastructure. Chinese investors for their 
part do not believe investing in Russia will 
guarantee returns. 
Politically, despite Xi and Putin being labelled 
as ‘strongmen’ on various occasions, each 
of them comes from different political 
background, with a very different ethos on 
how to make One-Party state work  
(Rachman, 2016). 
Each country wants to generate greater 
political clout globally, but their strategies for 
achieving this goal are contradictory.  
For Russia, economics matters, but it is only 
a part of Moscow’s geopolitical calculation. 
Whereas for China, economic developments 
take precedence, with growth Beijing’s  
answer to the question of how to become  
a great power. 
Each country sees itself as deserving to 
be a great power, and values highly the 
independence of their respective decision-
making. Neither wants to be a senior or a 
junior partner in a coalition and each dreams 
its own dreams. However, if Beijing wants  
to deliver the OBOR initiative, it needs to  
have Moscow’s backing or at least  
Putin’s acquiescence. 
The need for Soft Power and Followers
The Marshall Plan has not only created global 
economic and military alliances, but also 
most importantly, a global network of liberal 
democracies that share many common values 
with the US, and speak with a similar cultural 
frame of reference.
One of China’s insurmountable challenges 
in implementing OBOR remains if China 
can produce values echoed by its potential 
partners and attract followers that endorse 
Beijing’s conduct in domestic politics and 
foreign policy. Xi puts forward the phrase A 
Community of Shared Destiny, yet its precise 
definition remains unclear to the rest of the 
world. Beijing is in dire need of some PR 
work on this particular term. “The challenge 
for China going forward may be one of 
hearts and minds rather than dollars and 
pounds” (Shi, 2015). 
Unprecedented excitement from Chinese 
investors and companies about OBOR can 
stand in sharp contrast to the reticence and 
anxiety of its potential foreign partners.
Beijing has to realise that it is vital to fully 
engage with countries whose sovereign 
land and infrastructure system are to be 
built, and this includes conducting far wider 
international consultation on projects under 
the OBOR initiative. The often-used term 
‘win-win’ cannot be China’s wins but  
others’ losses.
China should not automatically assume that 
the growth through gigantic infrastructure 
investments, which drove China’s economic 
success in the past, is a panacea and 
embraced by all stakeholders. Many OBOR 
participant countries have doubts and fears 
about issues in sovereignty, autonomy, local 
employment, distribution of budgets, and the 
general returns on investments.
China’s words and deeds should make 
genuine attempts to generate positive 
influences and not merely treat the involved 
partners as vehicles to achieve China’s benefit 
alone. However, as so often is the case 
with China’s foreign affairs, OBOR seems 
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fundamentally rooted in a Sino-centric 
approach to the world, driven chiefly by 
inward-looking impulses and intended 
primarily to meet pressing domestic needs. 
Short in expertise and economic viability
Another imminent challenge for OBOR’s 
success derives from inside China. China is 
not yet equipped with an extensive network 
of home-grown experts who have strong 
command of knowledge of the regions 
within the OBOR framework.
According to the proposed OBOR 
development plan, infrastructure 
investments and connectivity projects will 
run through more than 60 countries across 
Central Asia, Europe, West Africa, South 
Asia, and Southeast Asia. Apart from a 
large number of engineers, evaluating 
the viabilities of OBOR projects requires 
geopolitical strategists who know the 
respective regions inside-out, it needs 
financial experts to understand the host 
countries’ fiscal and monetary policies, and 
it needs demand project management teams 
having special knowledge of the local labour 
market.
However, at the moment there are only 
a handful (less than 20) Central Asia and 
Middle East specialists inside China who are 
closely following the geopolitical situation 
within the two regions5. 
Most of those experts have no direct access 
to the key government officials, influential 
academics, and business leaders of countries 
in Central Asia and the Middle East. Much of 
their existing research outputs are based on 
arbitrary collections of evidence rather than 
systematic analyses of the target countries. 
Most of the senior management teams of 
large Chinese SOEs who may potentially 
engage with OBOR-related projects are 
appointed by the Party and equipped with 
industrial expertise, but not the necessary 
management skills and general market 
knowledge of the host countries. For 
example, they are usually unfamiliar with  
the market environments of host countries 
with little understanding of local labour 
union politics. 
SOEs may hire leading global professional 
services firms to develop their potential 
OBOR projects. Some Chinese companies 
believe that outsourcing professional services 
firms is equivalent to possessing sound 
project-management skills themselves and 
therefore readiness to pursue OBOR projects. 
Chinese companies utilise professional 
services firms mostly on the basis of their 
reputations rather than their specific 
knowhow. In part, this reflects the fact that 
engaging such major multinationals is often 
primarily a signal of their determination to 
pursue OBOR projects in line with central 
government objectives.
While OBOR encourages the participation 
of Chinese private companies to in 
public-private partnerships, most Chinese 
private companies are prioritising profit 
maximisation over paying attention to 
building local relationships. Such an attitude 
deviates from what OBOR goals for both 
parties and risks reputational damage. 
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COnCLUSIOn
OBOR is very much in line with the distinctive Chinese 
character of past grand initiatives. That is fluid in nature, 
opaque in implementation plan, and flexible in concrete 
measures of projects. Such unique features are well 
understood and practiced by Chinese political elites in 
their corridor of power, yet frustrate foreign partners 
both at the governmental level and in entrepreneurial 
communities outside China.
It is important for the Chinese leadership to not become 
too Sino-obsessed, and to retain a keen interest in what 
others want, expect, or fear from their interactions with 
China under the OBOR framework. Like  
many other issues in China’s foreign affairs it should not 
be forgotten that OBOR, whilst clearly dependent on 
Chinese objectives and actions, is also dependent on how 
others interpret these objectives and how they act on 
these interpretations.
Close scrutiny of the official OBOR document published 
in 2015 reveals it to be largely an effort to advertise the 
OBOR initiative. It suggests the proposed achievements of 
the initiative at the economic and strategic level, rather 
than referring any concrete methodology to achieve 
them. The document does not offer any time frame or 
deadline, and more importantly, does not suggest any 
business model to make the initiative work. Sooner 
or later, the Chinese government must have concrete 
answers to fill in those conspicuous omissions if OBOR is 
going to be a success. 
A central challenge to any future Chinese leadership 
will be how to develop a global foreign policy and 
respond to concerns in regions that are historically little 
known in China, but will affect and be affected by the 
country’s economic growth. In order to improve its 
global diplomacy, China needs to draw on policies that 
go beyond the simple purposes of securing China’s own 
economic interests. One hopes Beijing will learn this very 
quickly from its long march to the new Silk Road.
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1 The author is deeply in debt to many contributors 
from the public and the private sectors who shared 
their candid views. 
2 From a recent interview at the Chinese State 
media with Russian delegation who participated in 
Belt and Road Forum. 
3 A key post for those who want to step into the 
Standing Committee of the CCP Politburo of the 
CCP Central Committee. 
4 Please refer to Deng’s 24 characters summary on 
the Chinese foreign policy when he met with the 
then UN Secretary General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar. 
5 Courtesy of some Chinese senior academics and 
diplomats in Beijing.
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The world is excited, yet confused about the potential 
of China’s One Belt, One Road (OBOR) initiative. What 
exactly is it? This Strategic Update explains the origins 
of the idea, who in Beijing really runs OBOR, and the 
existential challenges to the project.
China’s One Belt, One ROad: 
a Reality CheCk
